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SNYDER V. PHELPS NOTE

Snyder v. Phelps: The Demise of Constitutional Avoidance
Emily Horowitz*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over 200 years ago when the First Congress of the United States set forth
the Bill of Rights, the application of the First Amendment1 was a seemingly
simple task.2 This, however, proved not to be the case.3
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Snyder v. Phelps4, coupled
with the Supreme Court’s granting of certiorari on the issue confirmed the great
extent to which First Amendment law remains unsettled. Despite the unresolved
nature of First Amendment law and the fact that the “Supreme Court has never
addressed the specific issues of laws designed to protect the sanctity and dignity
of memorial and funeral services as well as the privacy of family and friends of
the deceased,”5 a court should not address a constitutional issue when other
grounds exist for the disposition of the case.6
In Snyder, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the United State
District Court for the District of Maryland’s judgment in favor of the plaintiff,
Snyder, and determined that the defendant’s speech and written epic were
protected forms of speech under the First Amendment.7 In a witty concurrence,

*

Editor‐in‐Chief, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2012, University of
Miami School of Law; B.A. 2003; M.S. 2008, University of Miami. Thank you to my family
and friends for their continued support.
1
Jason M. Dorsky, A New Battleground for Free Speech: The Impact of Snyder v. Phelps,
7 PIERCE L. REV. 235 (2009) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I) (“Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech . . .”).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010).
5
Bill Mears, Justices To Hear Case over Protests at Military Funerals, CNN.COM,
http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/03/08/homosexuality.protest/index.html
(last
visited July 19, 2010) (internal quotations omitted).
6
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 227 (Shedd, J., concurring).
7
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 206.
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Judge Shedd argued that under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, this
case should not be resolved on the First Amendment issue.8
This note argues that Shedd’s concurrence in Snyder is correct and should
be followed on two grounds. Part II of this note presents a factual and
procedural background of Snyder v. Phelps. Part III provides a historical account
of First Amendment case law and its application in Snyder v. Phelps. Part IV is an
analysis of the Majority’s arguments. Part V analyzes the concurrence and argues
why it is correct. Finally, Part VI discusses the potential consequences of the
decision in this case.
II. SNYDER V. PHELPS: FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On March 3, 2006, Matthew Snyder was killed in the line of duty while
serving in the Iraq war.9 Albert Snyder arranged for his son’s funeral to be held
on March 10, 2006 at St. John’s Catholic Church in Westminster, Maryland.10
Fred Phelps, Pastor of Westboro Baptist Church, along with other members of
his Kansas‐based congregation, decided to picket outside Matthew Snyder’s
funeral in order to publicize their message of God’s hatred of America because of
its tolerance of homosexuality.11 Phelps complied with police instructions and
local ordinances and maintained the required distance from the church while
picketing.12 After returning from Matthew Snyder’s funeral, Phelps‐Roper, the
daughter of and attorney for Fred Phelps, published an “epic” titled, “The
Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder,” on the church’s website.13 At
trial, Snyder admitted that he did not actually see the signs displayed outside the
church during Matthew’s funeral.14 Further, he testified that he learned about
Phelps‐Roper’s epic only after running an Internet search.15
B. Procedural Background
Snyder filed a complaint alleging five tort claims against Fred Phelps, the
Church, Shirley Phelps‐Roper, and Rebekah Phelps‐Davis in June 2006.16 The
claims were defamation, intrusion upon seclusion, publicity given to private life,
8

Id. at 227.
Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571–572 (D. Md. 2008).
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Snyder, 533 F. Supp. at 571–572.
16
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 211.
9
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intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy.17 In October
2007, the district court granted the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
on the defamation and publicity given to private life claims.18 The remaining
three claims subsequently went to trial, where the jury returned a verdict for
Snyder, awarding him an aggregate $10.9 million in damages.19 In a post‐trial
opinion, the district court remitted the punitive damages award, resulting in a
total award of $5 million for Snyder.20 Defendants appealed to the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, contending that the district court’s judgment violated their
First Amendment right to freedom of speech.21 The Fourth Circuit reversed the
district court’s judgment, holding that the Phelps’ signs and epic were both
forms of protected speech under the First Amendment.22 On December 23,
2009, Snyder submitted his Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and on March 8, 2010,
the Supreme Court granted his request.23
III. PRIOR LAW: A HISTORY OF RELEVANT FIRST AMENDMENT DECISIONS AND THEIR
APPLICATION TO SNYDER
In Snyder, Judge King began his analysis of First Amendment case law
with a discussion of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan24. Sullivan, a case of first
impression for the United States Supreme Court,25 addressed the issue of to
what extent the First Amendment limited Alabama’s power to award damages in
a libel action brought by a public official.26 In that case, Sullivan brought a libel
action against the New York Times and four petitioners after the New York Times
published a full‐page advertisement entitled, “Heed Their Rising Voices.”27 The
advertisement contained several paragraphs mentioning the unfair treatment of
Alabama State College students by the police.28 Though Sullivan’s name was not
specifically mentioned in the advertisement, he felt that because he was the
Montgomery Commissioner responsible for supervising the police department,
the word “police” in the third paragraph was a reference to him.29 The Supreme
Court unanimously ruled in favor of the New York Times when it “established a
rule barring public officials from recovering damages for the common law tort of
17

Id. at 212.
Id. at 213.
19
Id. at 213–215.
20
Id. at 216.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 223–224.
23
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. Dec. 23, 2009).
24
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
25
Id. at 256.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 256–257.
28
Id. at 257.
29
Id.
18
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defamation unless the allegedly defamatory statement was made with actual
malice....”30
While the Court expanded constitutionally protected speech to public
officials in New York Times, and later to public figures31 in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,32 it declined to extend it further to private figures.33 In ruling that the
district court erred by its use of an incorrect legal standard in its Post‐Trial
Opinion, the Fourth Circuit stated in Snyder that “the [district] court focused
almost exclusively on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gertz. . .[although] [t]he
Supreme Court has created a separate line of First Amendment precedent that . .
. does not depend upon the public or private status of the speech’s target.”34
The Fourth Circuit termed the 1990 case Milkovich v. Lorrain Journal
Co., “crucial precedent” in its analysis and disposition of Snyder. In Milkovich,
the Court addressed whether a newspaper that published a column referring to
a wrestling coach as a liar enjoyed First Amendment protection.36 The Court
clarified the dispositive question as “whether a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that the statements in the . . . column imply an assertion that
Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial proceeding.”37 The Court reasoned that
because the column’s assertions were “susceptible of being proved true or
false,” they were not protected by the First Amendment.38 The Fourth Circuit
applied Milkovich in Snyder to determine that the Phelps’ speech and epic were
constitutionally protected because they fell within the two subcategories of
speech that “cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about an
individual.”39 Milkovich stated that the First Amendment protects statements on
matters of public concern and rhetorical statements or hyperbolic language.40
35

While Milkovich was undoubtedly “crucial precedent” to the disposition
in Snyder, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell41 is the case at the core of what will
ultimately become a final decision on Snyder by the highest court in the land.
Petitioners presented and were granted certiorari on three questions.42 The first
30

Snyder, 580 F.3d at 218 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–280
(1964)).
31
See, e.g., Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967).
32
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
33
Id. at 344–347.
34
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 222.
35
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
36
Id. at 4–5.
37
Id. at 21.
38
Id.
39
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 219.
40
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21.
41
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
42
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. Dec. 23, 2009).
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question43 presented was “whether Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell is
applicable to private individuals versus private individuals.”44
Hustler arose when Jerry Falwell sued Hustler magazine and Larry Flint to
recover damages for libel, invasion of privacy, and IIED after a “parody” of an
advertisement insinuating that Falwell had drunken incestuous relations with his
mother was published by Hustler in November, 1983.45 The Supreme Court
reversed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment against petitioners, stating that “[t]he
State’s interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is not
sufficient to deny First Amendment protection. . . .”46 The Court reached this
conclusion by reasoning that Falwell was a public figure for First Amendment
purposes and Hustler’s parody was not reasonably believable.47
In their Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Petitioners argued that if Hustler
magazine is applied to cases involving private individuals versus private
individuals, “the victimized private individual is left without recourse.”48 In their
Brief in Opposition to Petition of Writ of Certiorari, Respondents stated that
“[t]he outcome of Falwell . . . should have come as no surprise; and . . . this
outcome should be the same whether a plaintiff claims private status or public
figure status. . . .”49
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court felt that the questions
presented in Snyder need to be resolved. However, as Judge Shedd cleverly
pointed out, “it is not a habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional
nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.”50 Since this case
involves whether the elements of the torts intrusion of privacy and IIED were
proven, Snyder is not a First Amendment issue and should not be treated as
such.51

43

The second question presented was, “Does the First Amendment’s freedom of speech
tenet trump the First Amendment’s freedom of religion and peaceful assembly?” The
third question addressed whether an individual attending a family member’s funeral
constitutes a captive audience who is entitled to state protection from unwanted
communication. Id.
44
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. Dec. 23, 2009).
45
Hustler, 485 U.S. at 47‐48.
46
Id. at 46.
47
Id.
48
Petition for Writ for Certiorari at 5, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. Dec. 23, 2009).
49
Brief in Opposition to Petition of Writ of Certiorari at 27, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751
(U.S. Jan. 20, 2010).
50
Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 227(4th Cir. 2009)
51
Posting of Daniel Solove to Concurring Opinions Blog (Mar. 16, 2010, 10:58 AM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/03/snyder‐v‐phelps‐funeral‐
picketing‐the‐first‐amendment‐and‐the‐inrusion‐upon‐seclusion‐tort.html.
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A. The Reasoning Behind the Majority’s Ruling

The Fourth Circuit reasoned that because the defendants did not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented against them at the circuit
court level, the issue was waived, though the defendants raised the issue at the
district court level, and amicus raised it at the circuit court level.52 Subsequently,
the circuit court only addressed the Defendant’s contention that the district
court’s judgment contravened their First Amendment rights.53
Drawing from the Court’s determination in Milkovich that speech on
matters of public concern involving rhetoric are protected forms of Free
Speech,54 the majority held that the Phelps’ signs and epic were constitutionally
protected expressions of their free speech.55 The court ruled that because the
signs “involve[d] matters of public concern” that “no reasonable reader could
[have] interpret[ed] . . . as asserting actual and objectively verifiable facts about
Snyder or his son,” they were entitled to First Amendment protection.56
Although the epic was titled “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew
A. Snyder,” the court reasoned that, “in light of its context and tenor,” a
reasonable person would not believe that actual facts were being asserted in it.57
Finally, the court held that Phelps‐Roper’s use of “atypical capitalization” and
“exaggerated punctuation” indicated the use of “loose, figurative or hyperbolic
language not connoting actual facts about Matthew or his parents.”58
B. Why the Concurrence Is Correct: Snyder Is not a First Amendment
Issue.
The rule that, ordinarily, an issue is waived when a party fails to raise an
issue in its opening brief is not absolute.59 For example, in Independent Insurance
Agents of America, Inc. v. Clark,60 the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari,
stating “the circuit court did have the authority to raise and decide an issue not
raised by the parties.” Writing for the majority in Snyder, Judge King even said “.
. . we acknowledge that the Supreme Court has seen fit . . . to address . . . an

52

Snyder, 580 F.3d at 216.
Id.
54
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990).
55
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 223.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 225.
58
Id. at 225–226.
59
Id. at 227(Shedd, J., concurring).
60
Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc. v. Clarke, 965 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C.
Cir.1992).
53
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issue raised solely by an amicus.”61 Judge Shedd was correct in his concurrence
when he pointed out that The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of
Free Expression raised the issue in their amicus brief.62 Subsequently, the Fourth
Circuit should have evaluated the district court’s ruling on the state tort law
claims, and not on the First Amendment issue.63
1. Snyder Failed To Prove that Phelps Committed the Tort of
Inclusion Upon Seclusion.
Judge Shedd correctly argued that Snyder failed to prove the elements
necessary to establish Phelps’ liability for intrusion upon seclusion.64 The tort
intrusion upon seclusion provides, “one who intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”65 In general,
intrusion involves actions such as snooping, trespassing, and surveillance, but
not speech.66
Snyder claimed that Phelps committed intrusion upon seclusion because
of the Phelps’ protest outside the funeral and the “epic” which was posted on
the Church’s website.67 “Under Maryland law, an intrusion occurs when there
has been some act that interferes into a private place or the invasion of a private
seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or his affairs.”68 In
Snyder, the funeral took place at a public location and the protest occurred more
than 1,000 feet away from the funeral.69 Clearly, there was no intrusion because
the actual funeral service was not interrupted.70 Further, Phelps stopped
protesting when the church ceremony began and never confronted Snyder while
there.71 Even if the funeral service was interrupted, Snyder failed to prove that
61

Snyder, 580 F.3d at 217.
Id. at 228 (Shedd, J., concurring).
63
Id. at 227.
64
Id. at 228–229.
65
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
66
Posting of Daniel Solove to Concurring Opinions Blog (Mar. 16, 2010, 10:58 AM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/03/snyder‐v‐phelps‐funeral‐
picketing‐the‐first‐amendment‐and‐the‐inrusion‐upon‐seclusion‐tort.html.
67
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 229 (Shedd, J., concurring).
68
Id. (citing Furman v. Sheppard, 130 Md. App.67, 744 A.2d 583,586 (2000))(internal
quotations omitted).
69
Posting of Daniel Solove to Concurring Opinions Blog (Mar. 16, 2010, 10:58 AM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/03/snyder‐v‐phelps‐funeral‐
picketing‐the‐first‐amendment‐and‐the‐inrusion‐upon‐seclusion‐tort.html.
70
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 230 (Shedd, J., concurring).
71
Id.
62
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the funeral was private. “Unlike most civilian funerals, military funerals include a
public dimension. Funerals for soldiers killed in war generate greater publicity.”72
Considering that the Phelps’ protest did not interrupt the funeral, which took
place in a public location, Snyder’s claim that he was the victim of invasion of
privacy by intrusion upon seclusion fails.73
Likewise, Snyder’s claim that Phelps‐Roper is liable for invasion of privacy
by intrusion upon seclusion because of the “epic” posted on the Church’s
website is also inadequate.74 In order for Snyder to have prevailed, he would
have had to prove that Phelps‐Roper actually took action in intruding into his
private life. Upon posting her epic, Phelps‐Roper did not take any action
specifically directed at Snyder.75 In Doe 2 v. Associate Press,76 the Fourth Circuit
said that in order to be liable for wrongful intrusion, “a defendant must have
engaged in conduct that resembles ‘watching, spying, prying, besetting, or
overhearing.’”77 In posting her epic, Phelps‐Roper did none of these things. In
fact, the only reason Snyder found out about the epic was through his very own
behavior of searching the Internet.78 Any intrusion that Snyder might have
experienced resulted from his own actions.79 By posting an epic on a Church’s
website without having engaged in any of the recognized intentional behavior
that the Fourth Circuit has determined to be “intrusive,” Phelps‐Roper did not
commit the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.
As a matter of public policy, Phelps should not have been held liable for
intrusion upon seclusion for the epic.80 “If a valid cause of action arises every
time someone sees himself referenced in an opinion expressed on the Internet—
where millions of people express their honest opinions of people every day—or
on television, and the opinion is non‐defamatory, the floodgates of litigation
could burst with potential lawsuits.”81 Summarily, the Fourth Circuit should have
reviewed and reversed the district court’s judgment in favor of Snyder on his
claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion.

72

Njeri Mathis Rutledge, A Time To Mourn: Balancing the Right of Free Speech Against
the Right of Privacy in Funeral Picketing, 67 MD. L. REV. 295 (2008).
73
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 231 (Shedd, J., concurring).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Doe 2 v. Associate Press, 331 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 2003).
77
Doe 2, 331 F.3d at 422 (quoting Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 6
(S.C. Ct. App. 1989)).
78
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 231 (Shedd, J., concurring).
79
Id.
80
Jason M. Dorsky, A New Battleground for Free Speech: The Impact of Snyder v. Phelps,
7 PIERCE L. REV. 235 (2009).
81
Id.
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2. Snyder Failed To Prove that Phelps Committed the Tort of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
The Phelps were also incorrectly held liable for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.82 The tort provides, “[o]ne who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to
the other results from it, for such bodily harm.”83 IIED is a tort that “is to be used
sparingly and only for opprobrious behavior that includes truly outrageous
conduct.”84 Maryland courts have frequently refused to uphold IIED in the
context of egregious behavior.85 As such, had the Fourth Circuit analyzed the
district court’s ruling that Phelps was liable for IIED, the decision would have
likely been reversed.
The Fourth Circuit should have addressed and reversed the district
court’s judgment in favor of Snyder on this issue for both legal and public policy
reasons. Snyder claimed that he was a victim of IIED because his grieving process
was interrupted by the Phelps’ behavior and the media attention resulting from
it.86 Snyder also contended that he was the victim of IIED because he was
burdened with having to shelter his young daughters from the media coverage of
the protests at Matthew’s funeral.87 While the additional burden of having to
shelter his daughters from the Phelps’ protest might have been an annoyance to
Snyder and his family, particularly at a time of grieving the death of their young
son, “the law is clear that mere insults or annoying behavior will not satisfy [the
extreme and outrageous] element of the tort; in fact, even epithets, profanity,
and racial slurs may not suffice. . . .”88 As distasteful as the signs presented at the
protest might have been, the Phelps’ conduct at Matthew’s funeral “simply
d[id]not satisfy the heavy burden required for [IIED] under Maryland law.”89
Public policy reasons provide additional weight to the argument that the
Fourth Circuit should have evaluated and reversed the district court’s judgment
82

Snyder, 580 F.3d at 231 (Shedd, J., concurring).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1965).
84
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 231 (Shedd, J., concurring).
85
See, e.g., Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 602 A.2d 1191 (1992) (ruling that
defendant’s conduct failed to satisfy the high standard for extreme and outrageous
conduct); see also Mitchell v. Baltimore Sun Co., 164 Md. App. 497, 883 A.2d 1008
(2005) (ruling that reporter’s behavior was not extreme and outrageous enough for her
to be held liable for IIED).
86
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 231 (Shedd, J., concurring).
87
Id. at 232 (Shedd, J., concurring).
88
Brief for the State of Kansas, 47 Other States, and the District of Columbia as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 21, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. Jan. 23, 2010).
89
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 231 (Shedd, J., concurring).
83

296

U. MIAMI NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. [Vol. 1

on the issue of IIED liability. While the “defendants’ speech . . . is uncommonly
contemptible . . . many more ideas than just the Phelpsians’ would be
endangered if the Court allowed the intentional infliction of emotional distress
tort to cover the expression of offensive ideas.”90 Holding Phelps and the Church
members liable for IIED when all they did was join the “massive public
discussion”91 about the war, the soldiers and their deaths would be to open the
floodgates to IIED litigation.
The Fourth Circuit erred in failing to evaluate the district court’s
judgment on the state‐based torts of invasion of privacy through inclusion upon
seclusion and IIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
In violation of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Supreme
Court has unnecessarily charged itself with the difficult task of choosing to either
expand or limit the application of Hustler to cases involving private parties versus
private parties. On the one hand, if the Court expands Hustler to apply to private
parties, it will severely restrict the remedies available to private parties.92 On the
other hand, if the Court restricts publically disdained speech outside of public
places, such as funerals, this could potentially begin a trend in the courts
towards limiting freedom of speech. Because this appeal could have been
decided on a non‐constitutional basis93 it is both astounding and disappointing
that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case.

90

Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Tort, Cardozo L. Rev. de novo (forthcoming 2010).
91
“A massive public discussion is underway in this nation. . . [e]veryone is using the
occasion of the soldiers’ deaths to comment. . . WBC joined that discussion, on the same
sidewalks where others were standing engaged in the discussion. . . .” Brief in
Opposition to Petition of Writ of Certiorari at 60, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. Jan.
20, 2010).
92
Petition for Writ for Certiorari at 5, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09‐751 (U.S. Dec. 23, 2009).
93
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 227 (Shedd, J., concurring).

